

APPENDIX A

Austria

WRR

WETENSCHAPPELIJKE RAAD VOOR HET REGERINGSBELEID

Inhoudsopgave

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I Summary

The Austrian Federal Police is the most significant public security provider in Austria and employs mostly short-term strategic forecasts, which might be influenced by the respective government in charge and its priorities. According to our interview partners within the Ministry of the Interior, under which the unified Federal Police resides, no long-term forecasts or visions are being developed. An important underlying reason relates to the unpredictability of the nature and prevalence of crime, as well as the unpredictability of societal and technological trends. Thus, principal questions surrounding the future of policing are not being asked or answered. Instead, specific problems are being addressed as they arise. Our academic interviewees stated that in Austria 'the bigger picture' regarding the organisation of policing is not being discussed in general. This was partly attributed to the fact that police science as a distinct field never developed in Austria and that specific issues are being illuminated by officials in charge, with no researchers looking in from an independent vantage point.

Our informants reported that neither digitalisation within the police nor the growth of cybercrime have led to a rethinking of policing in general. The Cybercrime Competence Center (C4) within the Criminal Police Office within the Ministry of the Interior is the main unit dealing with cybercrime in the narrower sense and consists of about 70 employees with various backgrounds. Digitalisation in law enforcement is being seen as a question of resources, training and legal competences (for instance, surveillance being allowed of (encrypted) communications over the internet). The fact that citizens interact more and more in a digital world in which therefore crime also increasingly takes place, is regarded more as an issue with technical ramifications, than one that necessitates fundamental reflections on how the police organize their work.

Privatisation of security is not on the agenda of policymakers, society, or academics either. All interviewees stated that whereas privatisation in general might have been a topic in the beginning of the century due to neoliberal impulses, it is not a current concern – despite observable trends such as steady increases in yearly revenues and number of employees of the private security sector. When confronted with these figures, the interviewees within the Ministry of the Interior conceded that private security has taken over some former police tasks, but that such transferrals are largely welcomed by the Federal Police, because they mostly concern preventative tasks that do not infringe upon the core tasks and competencies of the police. The Federal Police does not feel threatened by private security providers and the interviewed academics reiterated that the monopoly on the use of force and, more

importantly, the fact that the core of internal security is excluded from privatisation, is set in stone due to case law, which ensures that privatization does not pose any fundamental challenges.

a. Overview in numbers

Police (Sources: Austrian Parliament, BMI – *Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2019*)

One federal police force, no state police forces, 37 municipal police forces

25,009 federal police officers in total (reference date 1 October 2018; occupied full-time positions of public servants who completed a two year long training as a policeman)

282 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants in 2018, 1 police officer for 355 inhabitants

488,912 police reports in 2019; 5.51 police reports per 100 inhabitants

304,422 suspects identified by the police in 2019

52.5 per cent clearance rate in 2019 (solved cases)

Yearly budget of the Ministry of the Interior about 2.9 billion euros in 2020

Cybercrime (Source: BMI – *Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2019*)

28,439 internet related criminal cases reported in 2019 (+45 per cent compared to 2018)

Cybercrime Competence Center (C4) as the main police unit against cybercrime

The Austrian police distinguishes between two categories of cybercrime:

- Cybercrime in the narrow sense (type I): attacks on ICT infrastructure, that is hacking, DDoS attacks
 - 7,622 police reports in 2019 (+148,3 per cent)
- Cybercrime in the broader sense (type II): IT as a tool for conventional crime, that is fraud, drug trade, child pornography
 - 20,817 police reports in 2019

Relating to the sharp increase in cybercrime, the police adopt a preventative approach in close collaboration with private industry (PPP), NGOs, other organisations. Moreover, cooperations with Europol through the European Policy Cycle and the European multi-disciplinary platform against criminal threats (EMPACT) are highlighted in the latest report on crime.

Private security industry (Source: vsö – *Jahrbuch Sicherheit 2020*)

17,206 employees in 2019

414 companies in 2019 (largest market shares: G4S, Securitas, Siwacht, öWD)

About 600 million euros revenue

Regulated by general commercial law (§§ 129, 130 *Gewerbeordnung*)

No special competences, only rights which apply to every person

(*Jedermannsrechte*)

No legally privileged access to firearms, standard legal application process, but firearms are regularly carried visibly in public by uniformed public security employees

II Policing in Austria

Austria is a federal republic consisting of nine states (*Bundesländer*). The Supreme Security authority is the Federal Minister of the Interior. Subordinate to the minister are the security directorates followed by the district administrative authorities. Every state has a security directorate (*Landespolizeidirektion*), which, contrary to the nomenclature, are nevertheless federal security authorities. The nine states of the federal republic are not empowered by the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law to create police structures on the state level. Thus, the police structure is legally limited to constabularies on the federal and municipal level.

The policing function is being defined in the Austrian Constitution as “*the maintenance of peace and order and security, including the provision of general first aid*”. The provision of general first aid refers to the obligation of the security police to avert a danger it otherwise technically would not be competent for until the responsible authority can intervene. The organisation of the security apparatus and the specific tasks and competences of the Security Police, consisting mainly of the Federal Police and 48 municipal constabularies, are regulated within in the Federal Security Police Act (*Sicherheitspolizeigesetz*).

The Austrian Federal Police (*Bundespolizei*) consisted of 25,009 police officers as of 1 October 2018. The Federal Police is merely a constabulary assigned to the respective authorities. Constabularies (*Wachkörper*) are armed or uniformed invested with tasks that have a police character. Moreover, the Federal Police might be characterised as a moderately centralised police structure since it has been the only federal police constabulary after organisational police reforms were enacted in 2005. In addition, the Austrian Constitution envisages in Article 10 that “*legislation and its implementation is a Federal concern (Bundessache) in the following matters [...] the maintenance of peace and order and security, including the provision of general first aid, but with the exclusion of local security police*”. As such, the federal police dominate the internal Austrian security architecture significantly. Austria also displays institutional and administrative centralisation towards Vienna as the capital in the east. Hence, the leadership of the Austrian Federal Police and, more importantly, the whole Ministry of the Interior under which the police reside and which is situated in Vienna, might be categorised as the focal point of any decision of importance.

According to most constitutional scholars, the monopoly on the use of force is legally speaking still a prerogative of the state, and internal security (*Sicherheit im Inneren*) in general is immune to privatisation (*privatisierungsfest*) and also to outsourcing (*ausgliederungsfest*). In their view, tasks relating to internal security – that is policing tasks in the traditional sense – are categorically

ineligible to be delegated to private security providers considering the Austrian constitution in its relevant version.

a. Policy papers

In recent years, the Ministry of the Interior regularly published yearly strategy reports (Ressortstrategie). The WRR looked at the reports of the last ten years and also interviewed a high-level official involved in the drafting process, which was explained in detail.

The process was developed by KPMG about ten years ago and has only been incrementally improved by the Ministry. At the core of its threat and situational analysis lies the Global Risk Report of the World Economic Forum. The yearly drafting process consists of an analysis phase and a workshop and meeting process consisting of the Minister of the Interior and high-level and mid-level officials of various bodies such as the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism, Criminal Police Office and the Regional Police Directorates. The strategy reports are characterised by a general and broad perspective since they are being based on the Global Risk Report, combined with specific measures envisaged relating to the Austrian Federal Police. The Ministry is deliberately not looking further ahead than a year or two. According to our interviewees this focus on the short term is due to the high uncertainty of the development of crime and speed of technological change. Ex post analyses of the reports do not take place in the sense that older strategy papers would be assessed accordingly. In conclusion, the Ministry of the Interior and as such the Austrian Federal Police tackle security challenges on a pragmatic yearly basis with no middle to long term forecasts being considered at all.

b. Fundamental questions pertaining to the Austrian Federal Police

Based on a close examination of the data stemming from the interviews and reports, the WRR could not identify fundamental questions that are discussed among academics and policy makers, pertaining to the core of policing. Instead, debates are dominated by specific issues, such as the already mentioned discussion surrounding the surveillance of new forms of communications or the basic training of police officers in cybercrime matters in order to alleviate the lack of resources and IT-experts. However, one interviewee did expound on two ostensible international trends, which were inversely noticeable in Austria: professionalisation of the police force and externalisation/transparency.

The first trend refers to the fact that the threshold for becoming a policeman has been lowered considerably over the past years, because the police had trouble acquiring new recruits in addition to recent high recruitment goals set by politics. As an example, a general qualification for university entrance is no longer required to become a police officer and the minimum age remained at

eighteen years contrary to international examples of higher age requirements to secure maturity and degree requirements. Our interviewee within the Ministry of the Interior nevertheless declared that the recruitment process and the standard of new police officers is adequate and satisfying.

The second trend refers to the fact that the Ministry of the Interior conducts training and research almost completely in-house. As such, it can be considered a closed organisation. Apparently, also collaboration with academia only happens sporadically and acquiring data for independent, external research is next to impossible for independent researchers, which was ventured as a reason why police sciences never developed as a distinct academic field in Austria. One interview partner within the Ministry of the Interior confirmed that external universities are only contacted in the context of specific project ideas. Issues related to professional confidentiality make it legally difficult for Austrian authorities to share data freely. There are collaborations with NGOs, which are part of the official curriculum of the police academy, for example to raise awareness for human rights (see for example the collaborative project *POLIZEI. MACHT.MENSCHEN.RECHTE*). Thus, institutionalised or regular exchange with external researchers or organisations does not take place, but on specific issues the police has embraced collaborations with researchers and civil society.

Both interview partners also mentioned that Austria will soon be introducing an independent administrative body, which would investigate accusations of police violence independently for the first time according to the current coalition agreement.

All in all, the approach of the Austrian Federal Police might best be characterised as pragmatically conservative since (i) the traditional roles of the police are not being questioned or re-imagined by anyone; (ii) there is very little exposure to independent external scrutiny; and (iii) topic challenges are addressed by short term strategies that look ahead only over one to two years.

c. **Municipal police forces and plural policing**

As mentioned above, the Austrian Constitution only allows for police bodies on the federal and municipal level for local public safety matters (*örtliche Sicherheitspolizei*). The area of responsibility for the 48 municipal police forces is strictly limited to public safety matters concerning the local community such as public decency and defence against the improper creation of noise. Thus, municipal police forces operate next to federal police officers and also next to private security employees (for instance, in charge of a train station) and municipal wardens (for instance, in charge of parking enforcement). Municipal police forces are trained in the same way and by the same institutions as federal police officers. Our interview partners repeatedly mentioned that there is no

competition discernible since their tasks are “*clearly separated*” from what the federal police force is responsible for (for instance, executing federal versus municipal security laws) and also because municipal police forces usually report to the mayor and not to any part of the federal chain of command.

Gemeinsam.Sicher (Together.Secure) is a prominent initiative of the Ministry of the Interior containing elements of plural and community policing. According to its mission statement it promotes and coordinates a professional security dialogue between citizens, municipalities and the police. As such, the initiative deals with very specific security issues. The following example will serve as a salient explainer of the initiative.

The first example concerns the central station of a small town at which groups of young people in combination with numerous thefts and drug offences led to an atmosphere of danger and insecurity. In order to address the challenge, workshops were held in nearby schools and the police started to improve coordination with the private security company in charge of the train station (for instance, enacting collaborative monthly security crackdowns). The train station started to play classical music in its entrance hall, put up bins and painted new lettering on the bottom. The municipality cleaned up the benches in the vicinity and a nearby parking garage and informed the public about the security issues and emergency measures. The police claim that those instances were exemplary success stories of this specific initiative. However, no data or independent studies have been published.

III Digitalisation and cybercrime law enforcement

The Austrian Police have been investing significant resources into new technologies such as cameras for observing demonstrations, a Cyber Crime Competence Center (C4) and a department for predictive policing. Also, bodycams were scheduled to be introduced but there are only about 20 available and there is a discussion going on regarding their use (for instance, if they should be on all the time or if the police officer should have the authority to decide when to turn them on). Regarding cyber law enforcement, the Cyber Crime Competence Center (C4) is the central unit for cyber law enforcement, but there also is a unit for cybersecurity within the BVT (Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism). Additionally, there is an ongoing cooperation between the BMLV (Ministry of Defence) and the BKA (Federal Chancellery).

The C4 is situated within the Criminal Police Office within the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna and consists of 68 employees and is responsible for cybercrime in the narrower sense, which refers to attacks on the networks themselves (for instance, hacking), contrary to cybercrime in the broader sense, which refers to the use of networks for conventional forms of crime such as online fraud or online drug trade. It is not necessary to be a police officer prior to joining the C4, which nevertheless has trouble recruiting adequately qualified personnel due to low salaries in comparison to the private sector.

At the nine regional security directorates, which are still federal agencies, there exist regional criminal police offices, which also entail cyber know-how (*Assistenzbereich 6*). At the level of police stations around 300 so-called district-IT-investigators (*Bezirks-IT-Ermittler*) can be found, which are police officers who have voluntarily been trained in the basics of cybercrime in the narrow sense by the C4 in a three-week course. As such, they learn how to recognise cybercrime and to report it correctly, which unfortunately is a big issue with standard police officers. The Ministry aims to have three of those district-IT-investigators available for assistance in every political district. In general, there are no incentives whatsoever for employees focusing on cyber. While a police officer patrolling the street might receive a hazard pay, no supplements are available for cyber employees. Which may at least partly explain the challenge of attracting sufficient qualified personnel.

The main tasks of the C4 revolve around criminal investigations, but our interviewees also emphasised some preventative-oriented initiatives, which mainly consist of cooperating closely with the Chamber of Commerce, for example by giving informative presentations or by sharing new and

up-to-date methods for the commission of cybercrime. The C4 does not consider preventively patrolling the cyber domain. As such, the traditional notion of a police officer patrolling the streets is not translatable to the internet, according to our sources. One academic interviewee specialised in cybercrime and police sciences also stated that some traditional concepts do not play a role in the cyber realm such as privileged norms pertaining to catching criminals red-handed or preventive patrols. Some interviewees also mentioned elements of intelligence-led policing, which is mainly the responsibility of intelligence agencies, but that discussion would quickly run dead on the theme of the surveillance state according to our conversation partners. One interviewee mentioned the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, which has been in effect since 2004 but is still lacking certain content, such as the inclusion of data theft. In addition, the interviewee criticised sentencing guidelines for cybercrime, which are quite moderate compared to other offenses.

Regarding data requests from private platforms, one needs to distinguish between national platforms, which are more cooperative and forthcoming – because legal provisions force them to – and international platforms such as Facebook, which only cooperate according to their own legal opinion and only in the case of serious criminal offences such as child pornography, murder or imminent calamities such as suicide announcements. In practice, a data request is being signed off by the prosecutor before the police may contact the respective platform.

In order to tackle practical issues of information requests, a unit responsible for centralising inquiries to get an overview of social media platforms has been established within the C4, this unit provides, for example, guidelines for how a request to a specific platform should look in order to be successful. It was mentioned that subscriber data are quite easily acquired but that content data are much harder to get a hold of. In practice, the platforms often determine whether the police get access to the requested data.

One interviewee within the C4 criticised the law as outdated regarding cybercrime, referring to already mentioned sentencing guidelines, lacking offenses such as data theft under the Budapest Convention and the fact that as of today the police do not have the legal competence to surveil (encrypted) communications conducted via the internet (for instance, WhatsApp, Telegram). One academic interviewee stated that even in scholarly circles the latter demand is viewed as legitimate and desirable since it does not make sense that the police is allowed to surveil text messages via the short message service but not messages sent via WhatsApp. This example indicates that the police do not necessarily view this as a fundamental issue but rather as a single specific challenge that needs to be addressed by the legislature. It is necessary that provisions mirroring the

competences for the surveillance of text messages are enacted for modern social media as well as for communication platforms. On 18 October 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the police did introduce the possibility to report theft online.

a. Fundamental questions

The WRR could not discern in interviews or documents that any fundamental questions have been identified or addressed in Austria, by policy makers, the police or academia, pertaining to societal trends such as digitalisation and cybercrime, or any other trends. Hence, a visionary rethinking of policing against the backdrop of digitalisation or privatisation of policing has not taken place. Instead, particular issues arising are being addressed on a case by case basis – similar to the conclusion regarding the very short-term yearly strategy paper. Structural issues revolve around lack of resources, the fact that it is difficult to acquire competent employees considering the salaries for public servants, training police officers in the basics of cybercrime so that they would be able to file a proper report and technico-legal issues such as being able to surveil encrypted chats in messaging apps.

b. Countering hate crime (Kommunikationsplattformen-Gesetz)

In September 2020 the Austrian coalition government presented extensive plans to combat hate crime on the internet and introduced a draft law, the *Kommunikationsplattformen-Gesetz* (communication platforms law), which aims to force the social media platforms to police their content more strictly. According to the draft, which mirrors the German *Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz*, communication platforms fulfilling certain criteria, such as having more than 100.000 Austrian users and generating over 500.000 euros revenue in Austria, would need to monitor the content consequently and also introduce a reliable reporting procedure including a responsible representative within Austria. The platforms themselves would need to acquire legal expertise in Austrian domestic criminal law in order to decide upon the legality of postings. A transparent review-procedure should avoid content over-blocking and self-censorship. Fines up to 10 million euros for non-compliance would be possible.

One interviewee supported this approach, stating that there clearly was a societal need to address the issue of hate crime and that an alternative to this approach focused on shifting the responsibility to private actors would require a massive expansion of police resources and competences, which s/he considered highly unrealistic. Another interviewee argued that criminal law is not designed to follow up on hate crime; hate crime should not be part of the criminal code except for instances passing a very high threshold. The interviewee preferred the approach adopted in the United Kingdom, which revolves around counternarratives and informative assistance of victims, which represents a

completely different strategy. Furthermore, s/he considered shifting more responsibility to communication platforms problematic, as it would be unrealistic to expect platforms to employ sufficient legal experts for every national jurisdiction to moderate all postings, ultimately leading to censorship.


Finally, one interviewee emphasised that over the past few years, a general trend of moving societal issues into the realm of the criminal law has taken place in Austria, referring specifically to current discussions surrounding insult laws and hate crime in the digital sphere. Criminal law scholars have tried to resist such a trend by referring to the ultima ratio principle, but to no avail.

IV Private security, its legal basis and public presence

The Austrian organisation of security companies (vsö – *Verband der Sicherheitsunternehmen Österreichs*) publishes a detailed yearly report of the industry, including data on revenue streams, the number of employees in the security industry and an outlook ahead. As of 2019, 414 companies employed around 17,206 workers and earned about 600 million euros in yearly revenues. The lion's share of the yearly revenue (about 68 per cent) is being earned by guarding tasks. The second most important task has been the transport of cash- and other valuables constituting about 20 per cent of the yearly revenue of the industry. Event security activities make up 5 per cent of the yearly revenue streams. All in all, the private security industry has experienced a continuous growth in recent years. The graphs used in this chapter stem from the most recent vsö report published in 2020.

Figure 1 shows the revenue of private security providers in Austria from 2011 to 2019 in millions of euros. The revenue in the private security industry has on average grown for about 5.5 per cent per year since 2011. The vsö surmises that a plateau has been reached and that clients are focusing less on acquiring security personnel but more and more on an affordable combination between security equipment and security personnel.


Figure 1. VSÖ – Yearly revenue private security industry Austria



Source: VSÖ

Figure 2 shows the total number of employees within the private security industry in Austria from 2011 until 2019, which has steadily increased over the years. It should be noted that no standards for training private security employees are in place yet; the goal of a unified and certified curriculum has been agreed upon by the ruling parties in their current coalition agreement, but it has not been implemented yet.

Figure 2. Yearly number of employees private security industry Austria



Source: Statistik Austria, Leistungs- und Strukturstatistiken; VSÖ

Private security has stepped in for tasks such as surveillance and security patrols in public places such as shopping malls and public transportation. Nevertheless, whereas about 17,207 private security workers are employed by 414 companies, private security personnel does not enjoy any special competences compared to anyone else, not even related to the application procedure for obtaining the right to carry firearms. As such, their competences are mainly limited to everyman's rights of exercising property rights of their clients such as denying entry, self defence and the right to private citizen's arrest including the obligation to immediately contact the security police. The private security business itself is being regulated by general commercial law (§§ 129, 130 *Gewerbeordnung*).

Our interviewees within the Ministry of the Interior emphasised concordantly that private security is not at odds with or even a threat to traditional policing. Instead, they have taken over the '*unpopular tasks*', which mainly lie in the realm of prevention. Therefore, activities carried out by private security officers

such as preventive patrolling of public train stations are actually welcomed by the Federal Police since it allows them to focus on other tasks.

The Federal Police itself does not sign contracts with private security companies for specific tasks, but municipalities and other bodies do, often on an event basis. Those contracts are not public. Regarding the use of private security in security checks at Austrian airports and the use within courts, there even exist two legal stipulations in the respective law (see *Luftfahrtsicherheitsgesetz* for airports and *Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz* for courts), which allow those contracts to be concluded by the respective authorities, such as the individual airport or the Ministry of Justice. This arrangement is a generally accepted provision and none of the interviewees classified it as strange or worth reconsidering.

Two interviewees mentioned the participation of private security in one deportation centre (*Polizeianhaltezentrum Vordernberg*). In this specific case, the municipality of Vordernberg has signed a contract with a private security company for assistance (*Schubhaftbetreuungsvertrag*). In situations where individuals are detained against their will, the Federal Police is still exclusively responsible for upholding security and the detention itself of the individuals, as this belongs to the core task of policing. A private security company can only be tasked with subsidiary, technical-humanitarian assistance and routine tasks such as providing activities to the detained (for instance, physical training, catering, cleaning, general supervision, checking visitors, room keeping).

Recapitulating the fact that the core of internal security in Austria is excluded from privatisation, our interview partners repeatedly referred to the case law of the Constitutional Court, in which the boundaries of these core tasks are outlined. It follows that certain situations, such as private security being employed in for-profit prisons in Austria, are unimageable for the stakeholders we spoke with.

All in all, privatisation of security is a clearly observable trend due to the stable increase in revenue streams and number of employees, but is nevertheless not seen as particularly relevant as it does not infringe upon the core tasks of the police. Interestingly, one interviewee observed a possible reverse trend after negative experiences due to lacking quality control with private security actors in the supervision of asylum seekers. A number of interviewees explained the occurrence of unprofessional conduct by private security companies, by referring to a profit driven focus and a lack of regulation. In contrast to police officers who go through a two-year training, private security personnel is usually just trained for a couple of days or weeks.

a. Fundamental questions

The WRR could not identify fundamental questions being discussed by policy, society or academia pertaining to the privatisation of security in Austria. Our interview partners unanimously agreed that privatisation of security is not a topic of societal concern. Some of our interviewees also stated that any discussion surrounding privatisation dates back to the beginning of the century and is as such not timely (anymore).

The situation might be classified as untroubled co-existence of police, society and private security actors based on clear demarcations. As already mentioned, private security and its focus on prevention through patrolling and security checks is even being welcomed by the police. As long as the industry does not infringe on the core of policing and as long as their area of responsibilities is clearly delineated, the police do not mind and do not feel threatened in its monopoly on the use of force at all. During our interviews it was also noticeable that private security mainly entered the realm of prevention, which is not considered problematic by the police. They are less inclined to see prevention as a core task, contrary to for example criminal investigations or law enforcement.

All in all, we see no evidence of a concerted effort to address challenges related to privatisation and digitalisation. Privatisation challenges have simply not been (publicly) identified or independently researched. Digitalisation challenges center around acquiring information, and some legal adaptations have been made to enforce this, with a special focus on hate crime, with likely negative corollary effects. The difficulty to hire ICT-qualified personnel was the single exception that was mentioned as a challenge that needs specific attention.

V List of interviewees

Univ.-Ass. Mag. **Isabel Haider** LL.M.: Isabel Haider is currently working as a university assistant for the Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology at the University of Vienna. In her research, she has focused especially on hate crime, hate speech, femicide and gender-based violence.

Mag. **Gregor Wenda** MBA: Gregor Wenda is Deputy Head of Department at the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), Secretary-General of the Austrian Society of Administrative Sciences and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the magazine *Öffentliche Sicherheit* being published by the BMI.

Kurt Hager BA, MA: Kurt Hager has been working for the Austrian Federal Police since 1979 and is currently the Head of the Office for Security Policy in Ministry of the Interior since 2012.

Dipl.-Ing. **Michael Mörz**: Michael Mörz is a civilian employee at the Cybercrime Competence Center (C4), which is situated within the Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) within the Ministry of the Interior. He is leading the unit 5.2.1. which is in charge of the central tasks of the C4, organisational support, training and administrative tasks.

Assoz. Prof. Mag. Dr. **Farsam Salimi**: Farsam Salimi is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology at the University of Vienna and member of the Austrian Center for Law Enforcement Sciences. He is an expert on criminal law, particularly cybercrime, and police law.